Shareholder wealth effects from mergers and acquisitions in the Greek banking industry by Constantine Manasakis
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 





BE.NE.TeC. Working Paper Series 
 
 
Working Paper: 2006-12 
 
 
Shareholder wealth effects from mergers and acquisitions 













Business Economics & NEw TeChnologies Laboratory 
 
www.soc.uoc.gr/benetec Shareholder wealth eﬀects from mergers and




This paper examines the shareholder wealth eﬀects of mergers and
acquisitions in the Greek banking industry from 1995 to 2001, using the
“event study methodology”. The results suggest that targets’ sharehold-
ers earned signiﬁcant abnormal returns upon the announcement of hori-
zontal and diversifying deals. On the other hand, bidders’ shareholders
had signiﬁcant losses in cases of horizontal and zero eﬀects in diversifying
deals. Although mergers and acquisitions in the Greek banking industry
are not found to be value-enhancing, they can be rationalized as an ex-
ternal growth strategy, whose goal was to strengthen the position of the
participants in the domestic market and help them become more tenacious
in a ﬁercely competitive international environment.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G34; G21; G14
Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions; Banking; Valuation eﬀects.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
As ﬁnancial intermediaries, banks play an essential role in the economy by trans-
forming assets, facilitating risk management, ﬁnancing trade, enabling capital
accumulation, and spurring technological innovation. Over the last two decades,
the banking and ﬁnancial services sectors have been subject to an ongoing re-
construction process with increasing consolidation activity through Mergers and
Acquisitions (M&A), as a major aspect of this process.1
∗I am grateful to Christos Cabolis and to participants at the 2004 Hellenic Finance &
Accounting Association (H.F.A.A.) Conference, Athens, December 2004, for helpful comments
and suggestions. Full responsibility for all shortcomings is mine.
†Department of Economics, University of Crete, University Campus at Gallos,
Rethymnon 74100, Greece, Tel: +302831077409 {manasakis@stud.soc.uoc.gr}.
1Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) suggest that at the beginning of this period, US deals
dominated the scene but, more recently, M&As in European banking have started to catch
up.
1Concerning the case of the European Union (E.U.), several factors have
been combined to facilitate consolidation within the banking industry. Walkner
and Raes (2005) mention that these factors include (i) the globalisation of the
international ﬁnancial system due to the liberalisation of international capital
movements and ﬁnancial deregulation within countries; (ii) major technological
advances, particularly in the ﬁeld of data processing; (iii) improvements in the
cross-border regulatory environment linked to the Single Market Programme
and the introduction of the euro, which has eliminated exchange risk in the
bulk of ﬁnancial ﬂows within the E.U.; and (iv) a diminishing eﬀect of the
so-called natural barriers such as language and culture.2
With respect to the shareholders’ wealth eﬀects of M&A transactions, most
of the available evidence comes from the U.S. market.3 Recently, M&A in the
European banking market have also attracted research interest. Cybo-Ottone
and Murgia (2000) estimate the shareholders’ wealth eﬀects in a sample of 54
M&A that were announced in the E.U. Member States’ banking sectors (except
for Greece and Luxembourg) and Switzerland, from 1988 to 1997. They ﬁnd
signiﬁcant and highly positive wealth eﬀects for targets’ shareholders, varying
from 12.93% to 15.3% as the event window covers ±1t o±20 days from the
event respectively. They also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant rise in stock market value for the
combined ﬁrm at the time of the deals’ announcement. Finally, they ﬁnd positive
results for deals between banks and insurance ﬁrms. Goergen and Renneboog
(2004) present the most recent evidence for the E.U. Examining a sample of 22
M&A deals in 18 European countries for the 1993-2000 period, they ﬁnd results
consistent with those obtained by Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000).
Concerning the case of Greece, although the deregulation of the Greek bank-
ing industry was accompanied by M&A that contributed to its evolution, no at-
tempt has been made for the evaluation of the shareholders’ wealth eﬀects caused
by M&A.4 The only exception is Mylonidis and Kelnicola (2005) who examine
the ﬁnancial and operating performance of 5 merger deals across commercial
2See for instance McKinsey (2002) and Morgan Stanley (2003).
3Becher (2000), surveying the early evidence for the U.S., documents that target ﬁrms
gained about 20% and bidder ﬁrms roughly broke even. The author also examines the valu-
ation eﬀects of 558 bank mergers from 1980-1997 in the U.S. and ﬁnds that bank M&A did
create wealth. On average, over a 36-day event window, targets’ shareholders gained over
2 2 % ,b i d d e r s ’b r o k ee v e n ,a n dc o m b i n e dﬁrms gained 3%. De Long (2001) presents a sample
consisting by 280 domestic M&A, announced from 1988 to 1995 between publicly traded ﬁrms.
He classiﬁes M&A according to the activity and geographic similarity (focus) or dissimilarity
(diversiﬁcation) of participants and ﬁnds that only M&A that were focused both on geogra-
phy and on activities earned a positive 3% return, while all other cases neither created nor
destroyed shareholder wealth.
4Several aspects of the Greek banking industry have been the subject of recent academic
research. Karafolas and Mantakas (1996) document operating-cost scale economies over the
period 1980-1989. Hondroyiannis et al. (1999) suggest that the gradual deregulation increased
the competitiveness of the Greek banking industry from 1993 to 1995. Eichengreen and Gibson
(2001) ﬁnd that for the period 1993-1998, economies of scale existed up to medium sized banks,
but they disappear for larger banks. There is also a recent series of papers dealing with
productivity and eﬃciency issues of the Greek banking industry, but the evidence is mixed
and inconclusive. See e.g. Noulas (1997); Christopoulos and Tsionas (2001); Christopoulos et
al. (2002); Spathis et al. (2002); Tsionas et al. (2003); Halkos and Salamouris (2004).
2Greek banks. Employing pre- vs. post-merger comparisons, their ﬁndings do
not provide evidence for performance gains resulting from bank mergers. Ap-
plying the “event study methodology”, they ﬁnd that mergers did create value
on a net-aggregate basis. However, their sample is extremely small and, with
respect to the event study methodology, they do not investigate the robustness
of their results under diﬀerent event windows.
Using the “event study methodology”, the present paper aims to ﬁll these
gaps and hence estimate the shareholders’ wealth eﬀects of M&A in the Greek
banking industry, from 1995 to 2001. Our sample contains all these cases of
M&A where at least one of the participants was a banking ﬁrm that was publicly
traded in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) at the time of the deal. Our
results suggest that targets’ shareholders had highly signiﬁcant gains, especially
in horizontal M&A, varying from 19% for the ±5 day event window, to 40%
for the ±20 day window. With respect to the bidders’ shareholders, the mean
wealth eﬀect is not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Horizontal M&A deals caused almost -10% losses for bidders’ shareholders,
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Moreover, the bidders’ losses are found to be sensitive
to whether the target ﬁrm was publicly traded in the ASE. In cases where the
target ﬁrm was traded, the bidders had signiﬁcant losses, while for those cases
where the target ﬁrm was not traded, the bidders had neither gains nor losses.
These results express the possible threat that bidders faced of partially losing
the control over the management of the post-integration combined ﬁrm, given
that the target ﬁrm was also listed in the ASE and thus, it was perceived as
a comparatively strong competitor. Diversifying M&A are found to have zero
wealth eﬀects for the bidders’ shareholders and signiﬁcant wealth gains for the
targets’ shareholders, varying from 22% to 24% for the diﬀerent event windows.
Some light is also shed on the incentives behind M&A in the Greek banking
industry as well. Using stock-market data, two distinct hypotheses are tested:
the “synergy hypothesis” and the “hubris hypothesis”.5 Our ﬁndings suggest
that M&A in the Greek banking industry had no eﬀects on the combined post-
integration ﬁrm’s value, implying that they were initiated in order to facilitate
“size” rather than “eﬃciencies”. To rationalize this ﬁnding, we reach M&A in
the Greek banking industry under the prism of its recent deregulation. From
the mid 1990s, the Greek banking system started operating under increased
competition and internationalization. Greek banks had to make eﬀorts in order
to increase or, at least, maintain their domestic market shares, facilitate their
access to international ﬁnancial markets and exploit any possible economies of
scale. M&A in the Greek banking industry, recorded since the mid-1990s, can be
perceived as a way to attain the above goals. Thus, M&A in the Greek banking
industry are explained as a twofold strategy: bidder banks increased their mar-
ket share and asset value and abstained from being acquired from competitors
in the short-run. Therefore, even if they were to be acquired in future, their
comparatively high value could allow them to charge a high purchase price.
5The terminology has been lent from Trautwein (1990) who oﬀers a complete presentation
of the diﬀerent theories for M&A incentives.
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief descrip-
tion of the recent changes in the Greek banking industry. Section 3 describes
how the sample is constructed and section 4 presents the method used. Section
5 presents the empirical analysis and results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The deregulation of the Greek banking indus-
try
Until the mid-80s, the Greek banking industry operated under the regulation
that was carried out through a complex system of credit rules, with administra-
tively ﬁxed interest rates. Tsionas et al. (2003) note that these rules aimed
at inﬂuencing the asset structure of the credit system in a way conductive
to the government’s economic policy priorities, such as promoting small and
medium-sized enterprises and ﬁnancing state-owned ﬁrms. The relevant market
was strongly oligopolistic, dominated by a small number of large state-owned
banks.6
By the mid-1980s, the need for a ﬂexible and market-oriented banking and
ﬁnancial system, and the prospects for participating in the Single European
Market initiated eﬀorts towards the deregulation of the Greek banking indus-
try. Market deregulation began in 1987 and by the early 1990s, bank interest
rates had been gradually liberalized and all quantitative credit restrictions and
investment requirements, concerning the ﬁnancing of the public industry, had
been phased-out. Moreover, the central bank had authorized commercial banks
to launch new ﬁnancial products, such as leasing, factoring and venture capital,
and specialized credit institutions were permitted to expand their activities in
commercial banking. The Basic Banking Law, concerning establishment, oper-
ation and supervision of credit institutions, incorporated the provision of the
Second Banking Directive and was passed in 1992.7 It set out the principles of
banking in the Single European ﬁnancial market and provided equal competi-
tive conditions for all European banking institutions. Foreign exchange controls
concerning current transactions were lifted in 1992, while capital movements
were completely liberalized in May 1994.
The privatization of several banks and the establishment of new, mainly
small, private banks were also important developments in the second half of the
past decade that contributed to the enhancement of competition in the market
as well. However, deregulation did not lead to any signiﬁcant increase in foreign
presence in the banking industry in the 1990s, in terms of the number of banks.
It is evident that from the mid 1990s, the Greek banking system started
operating under increased competition and internationalization. Tsionas et al.
(2003) note that banks operating in Greece had to adjust to the new conditions
and cope with the ensuing intensiﬁed domestic and cross-border competition.
6A complete review of the evolution of the Greek banking industry can be found at
Pagoulatos (1999) and Bryant et al. (2001).
7Directive 89/646/EEC of 15/12/1989 - EC Oﬃcial Journal N.386 of 30/12/1989.
4Thus, Greek banks had to make eﬀorts in order to increase or, at least, maintain
their domestic market shares, facilitating their access to international ﬁnancial
markets and exploiting any possible economies of scale.8
M&A in the Greek banking industry, as recorded since the mid-1990s, can be
seen as a way to attain the above goals. Several Greek banks have been involved
in M&A, since 1995. Most of these deals concerned the domestic market, includ-
ing not only banks but also non-bank ﬁnancial enterprises. Some large credit
institutions opted to merge with their subsidiaries with a view of restructur-
ing their activities and cutting their operating expenses. Additionally, several
banks tried to expand or further develop their activities in industries such as
“bancassurance”, where they can proﬁt from synergies and cross-selling by both
bank networks and insurance companies.9,10
3T h e s a m p l e
From 1995 to 2001, 19 M&A were recorded in Greece, in which at least one of
the participants was a banking ﬁrm, publicly traded in the ASE at the time of
the deal, and the transaction led to changes in the targets’ control.11 Note that
although our sample is comparatively small, it contains all these M&A deals that
aﬀected primarily the reconstruction of the Greek banking and ﬁnancial services
industry, in the post-deregulation era. The sample is presented in table A of the
Appendix. Note also that, in all cases, the bidder ﬁrm was a commercial bank
with 3-digit SIC 652. Then, the above 19 cases are classiﬁed in “horizontal”
and “diversifying” M&A according to the activity of the target ﬁrm. In order
to classify a case as a “horizontal” one, the target has to be a commercial
bank as well. In cases where the target’s 3-digit SIC is diﬀerent from 652, the
deal is classiﬁed as a “diversifying” one.12 Furthermore, diversifying M&A are
classiﬁed in three sub categories: in cases where the target ﬁrm is an insurance
company, a security ﬁrm and, ﬁnally, an investment bank.13.
In the above 19 cases, bidders were publicly traded in the ASE, with the
8Tsionas et al. (2003) present evidence according to which, over the period 1993-1998,
there had been a decline in the concentration ratio of the commercial banking market. More
precisely, the Herﬁndahl index (the sum of squares of market shares calculated over bank
deposits of the Greek banking system) decreased from 0.31 in 1993 to 0.25 in 1998.
9Kamberoglou et al. (2004) mention that M&A in the Greek banking industry resulted in
higher concentration: the market share of the top-5 banks as a percentage of total assets rose
from 57% in 1995 to 65% in 2000. This, however, has not led to less competition.
10Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) note that bancassurance is a European phenomenon as
regulations allow E.U. banks to own insurance subsidiaries and to perform in direct distribu-
tion of insurance products.
11In the present paper the attention is restrict e do nt h ei n t e g r a t i o nt r a n s a c t i o n st h a tl e d
to changes in the targets’ control, and not on the accounting treatment of these transactions.
Thus, the terms ‘Mergers’ and ‘Acquisitions’ are used equivalently.
12C a s e s4 ,5 ,7 ,8 ,9 ,1 0 ,1 2 ,1 3 ,1 4a n d1 6a r ec l a s s i ﬁed as horizontal M&A and cases
1,2,3,6,11,15,17,18 and 19 as diversifying.
13The target ﬁrm is an insurance company in cases 1, 11 and 19, while, in cases 3, 6 and 15
the target is a security ﬁrm. Finally, in cases 2, 17 and 18, it is an investment bank.
5exception of cases 5 and 10, while target ﬁr m sw e r el i s t e di nh a l fo ft h ec a s e s . 14
A ﬁnal classiﬁcation considers target ﬁrms: In most cases the target was a
domestic ﬁrm, but there are also cases (4, 12, 14 and 19) where the target ﬁrm
was a foreign one with a network of branches in Greece.
4T h e m e t h o d
To measure the short-term wealth eﬀects of M&A deals, the “event study
methodology” is employed.15 Firstly, for each merger deal, the event of in-
terest and its date, i.e. the date of the ﬁrst announcement of the deal (that is
the “event date” t0), is deﬁned and the “event window” [T1,T 2] with t0 ∈ [T1,T 2]
is determined.
Since the magnitude of any valuation eﬀect is sensitive to the length of the
event window, its determination is of great importance. Schwert (1996) conﬁrms
that there is a lot of evidence in support of the semi-strong hypothesis of market
eﬃciency with respect to M&A. From the other side, it is evident that the ASE
operates under weak eﬃciency.16 Thus, in order to reach robust results, the
event study methodology is employed for three diﬀerent event windows.17
Then, the market model (Rit = b ai + b βi ×Rmt +eit),e s t i m a t e df o rap e r i o d
ending at T1,g i v e sb ai and b βi for every security, with E(eit)=0and Va r(eit)=
σ2
ei. Rit i st h eo b s e r v e dr e t u r no ns e c u r i t yi for event day t and Rmt is the
market index portfolio rate of return in date t. Estimators b ai and b βi are used
to predict the “normal return” c Rit for each participant’s security, for each day
of the event window, with c Rit = b ai + b βi × Rmt.
Given the event window, the “abnormal return” for each day is given by
ARit = Rit − E(Rit|Xt). Rit and E(Rit|Xt) are the “actual”, and “normal”
return respectively for day t,w i t hXt being the conditioning information for the
normal return model. ARit = Rit − E(Rit|Xt) is transformed in eq. (1):
ARit = Rit − (b ai + b βi × Rmt) (1)
with ARit ∼ N(0,Var(ARit)) and Va r(ARit)=σ2
ei.
We then estimate the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)f o rﬁrm i,o v e r





14Target ﬁrms were listed in cases 1, 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, 16, 17 and 18.
15For an excellent presentation of the “event study methodology” see MacKinlay (1997).
16Kavussanos and Dockery (2001) and Siourounis (2002) provide recent evidence for the
weak eﬃciency under which the Athens Stock Exchange operates.
17Surveying existing papers, one concludes that there is little consensus about the duration
of the event window. On one hand, the measurement error may be substantial when using
narrow event windows but, on the other hand, as we increase the length of the announcement
period, the noise-to-signal ratio increases, and it becomes increasingly diﬃcult to measure
the impact of the event on share price with precision. To overcome this weakness is another
reason for undertaking the analysis under three diﬀerent event windows.
6Va r[CARi(T1,T 2)] = (T2 − T1 +1 ) σ2
ei and under the null hypothesis, the
event under study has no impact on the integration participants’ value. To





An aggregation of interest can also be performed across both time and events.














i. Under the null hypothesis, the event under study has no impact on





Houston and Ryngaert (1994) argue that looking only at the two separate
entities (bidder ﬁrm, target ﬁrm) may give a partial and perhaps distorted
interpretation of the market reaction to the deal’s announcement. Thus, in
cases where both integration participants were publicly traded at the time of
the announcement, a further step is to evaluate the market’s expectations on
the combined gain resulting from the deal. Following Houston and Ryngaert
(1994), the Total Cumulated Abnormal Returns (TCAR) are estimated as a
weighted sum of bidder’s and target’s Cumulated Abnormal Returns according
to the following equation:
TCARi(T1,T 2)=
MVB × CARB + MVT × CART
MVB + MVT
(4)
MVB and MVT is the value of the bidder and target ﬁrm respectively, t
days before the event date. In addition, CARB and CART are the cumula-
tive abnormal returns for the bidder and the target ﬁrm respectively, over the















Va r(CARB) × Va r(CART),w i t h
ρ
BT the estimated correlation between bidder’s and target’s market model resid-
uals for estimation of marked model prior to the event date. To gauge statis-
tical signiﬁcance, the corresponding Z-test, with Z =
TCARi(T1,T2) √
Va r [TCAR i(T1,T2)],i s
performed.
5R e s u l t s
In order to examine shareholders’ wealth eﬀects, caused by M&A deals in the
Greek banking industry, Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR), Cumulative
Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) and Total Cumulated Abnormal Returns
7(TCAR) have been measured for three diﬀerent event windows (±5, ±10 and
±20).
For each deal, the “announcement date” has been used as the “event date”.
The announcement date was the ﬁrst public oﬀer from the bidder bank to the
target bank, or the ﬁrst joint announcement (executive boards of both partic-
ipants) of the agreement to go forward the integration. The “announcement
dates” were found from bidders’ daily reports to the ASE. For the OLS, daily
returns for the securities and the General Market Index were used from -220 to
-20 days before the announcement of the deal. In cases where one participant
was not publicly traded for the full period of 220 trading days before the event,
only available observations are included. To construct daily return for each ﬁrm,
dividends have been taken into account. The data set for the securities’ and the
market’s portfolio returns were obtained from the Athens Stock Exchange Data
Bank.
5.1 Target versus bidding ﬁrms
Panel A of table 1 shows that M&A deals in the Greek banking industry had
no wealth eﬀects for bidders’ shareholders which is a consistent ﬁnding across
the three diﬀerent event windows.
On the contrary, evidence in panel B of table 1 demonstrates that M&A
had positive and highly signiﬁcant eﬀects for targets’ shareholders. For the
short event window (±5 days from the announcement), targets’ shareholders
earned about 20% signiﬁcant cumulative average abnormal returns, with CAAR
increasing in the duration of the event window, reaching about 34,6% for the
±20 day period.
Our results are in line with those reported by Cybo-Ottone and Murgia
(2000), with the exception that for extremely short event windows (±1a n d
±2d a y s )t h e yﬁnd positive abnormal returns for bidders. Our ﬁndings also
8coincide with those of Becher (2000), who documents that targets’ shareholders
gain positive abnormal returns, increasing in the duration of the event window.
Evidence presented here is also in line with the bulk of the relevant literature.
Röller et al. (2001), surveying an extended series of papers, conclude that, on
average, bidders’ shareholders have no gains while the average target shareholder
gain varies between 20 to 35 percent.
5.2 Horizontal versus diversifying M&A
Cases included in our sample have been classiﬁed in horizontal and diversify-
ing M&A, according to the activity of the participating ﬁrms. Becher (2000)
argues that horizontal M&A, where both participants are commercial banks,
can create value through the increase of market power and economies of scale,
while diversifying M&A, where only the bidder ﬁrm is a commercial bank, can
create value through the expansion of the services oﬀered and the formation of
an eﬀective internal capital market, lowering the cost of capital. Thus, how did
the relatedness of the M&A participants’ aﬀect shareholders’ wealth eﬀects in
the Greek banking industry?
5.2.1 Horizontal M&A
Let us begin with the case of horizontal M&A. Panel A of table 2 shows that
horizontal M&A deals caused almost -9,8% losses for bidders’ shareholders, sig-
niﬁcant at the 1% level. However, these losses decrease in the expansion of the
event window. It should also be mentioned that bidders’ losses are sensitive to
whether the target ﬁrm was publicly traded in the ASE. In cases where the tar-
get ﬁrm was publicly traded, the bidders had signiﬁcant losses about -15.7% for
the ±5 day event window, with losses decreasing in the duration of the window.
In contrast to this, for cases where the target ﬁrm was not traded, the bidders
had neither gains nor losses. Regardless of the potential economies of scale and
the certain market share increase, the above results (consistent with ﬁndings
of Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; 1997; Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000) express
the possible threat that bidders faced, of losing partially the control over the
management of the post-integration ﬁrm, given that the target ﬁrm was also
listed in the ASE. The fact that the target ﬁrm was listed in the ASE implied
that it was a strong competitor. In general, we conclude that for the horizontal
M&A, results for bidders are sensitive to the width of the event window and to
whether the target ﬁr mw a sl i s t e di nt h eA S Eo rn o t .
On the other hand, targets’ shareholders had considerable gains 19% for the
±5 day event window, with CAAR increasing in the duration of the window,
reaching 40% for the ±20 day window, all signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Evidence
presented in panel B of table 2 suggests that targets’ shareholders perceived the
horizontal M&A deals as opportunities to increase proﬁts and dividend yields.
Results for targets’ shareholders in horizontal M&A have to be considered under
the prism of the recent deregulation and the subsequent exposure of Greek banks
to the highly competitive global banking and ﬁnancial services industry. These
9changes made clear that the Greek commercial banks, although medium-sized
for the domestic banking industry, were highly threatened if they were to choose
a “standing-alone” strategy in the global market environment. Thus, targets’
shareholders perceived M&A as a vehicle to empower their position in the Greek
market and ensure their survival in the European market. Our results coincide
perfectly with the bulk of the relevant literature for the banking industry, where
targets’ shareholders gain signiﬁcant abnormal returns.
5.2.2 Diversifying M&A
Let us now examine shareholders’ wealth eﬀects caused by diversifying M&A
deals in the Greek banking industry. Panel A of table 3 shows that diversifying
M&A had neither positive nor negative wealth eﬀects for bidders’ shareholders.
Thus, bidder banks’ shareholders did not foresee any proﬁts increase through
cross-products deals, regardless of the type of the target ﬁrm. Evidence by De
Long (2001) suggests negative CAAR for bidders’ shareholders in diversifying
M&A, while Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) document wealth gains on the
10announcement of a diversifying merger or acquisition and especially in cases of
bancassurance.
According to targets’ shareholders, ﬁndings presented in panel B of table
3 indicate signiﬁcant wealth gains, varying from 22% to 24% for the diﬀerent
event windows. The explanation of this result is similar to the corresponding
for targets’ shareholders in horizontal M&A, given above. In addition, CAAR
for shareholders of insurance ﬁrms’ and investment banks are not statistically
diﬀerent from each other. Although results for bidders’ shareholders in cases
of diversifying M&A are inconclusive in the literature, the results documented
here are in line with those obtained by Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) and De
Long (2001).
5.3 Investigating the incentives behind M&A
M&A activity results in overall beneﬁts to investors if the combined post-
integration ﬁrm is more valuable than the sum of the two separate pre-integration
ﬁrms. The primary cause of this gain in value is supposed to be the performance
improvement following the integration. Using ﬁnancial market data, the event
study methodology measures the impact of M&A deals on ﬁrms’ value and
shareholders’ wealth. However, looking only at the two separate entities, a par-
tial interpretation of the market reaction to the deal’s announcement may be
given. Thus, in order to evaluate the combined post-integration ﬁrm’s value, the
Total Cumulated Abnormal Returns (TCAR) is estimated. Following Becher
(2000), MVB and MVT is the value of the bidder and target ﬁrm respectively, 30
days before the event date. Additionally, CARB and CART are the cumulative
abnormal returns for the bidder and the target ﬁrm respectively over the ±5,
±10 and ±20 day event window.
11By doing so, we shed some light on the incentives behind M&A:18 the an-
nouncement of a merger or acquisition deal is usually followed by statements
according to which, the incentives behind such a deal have their origins on
the synergies that will be gained and the subsequent eﬃciency improvements
and increase in competitiveness. However, there are M&A where either these
synergies are optimistic, or the actual incentives behind these transactions are
grounded on the ambitions of bidder ﬁrm’s managers. Therefore, two distinct
hypotheses of M&A incentives have been presented in the previous literature:
the “synergy hypothesis” and the “hubris hypothesis”.
If attaining synergies is the objective of the deal, the managers of both
target and bidder are intended to maximize shareholder value and we expect a
positive eﬀect on the combined post-integration ﬁrm’s value. According to the
hubris hypothesis, a merger deal is the result of the bidder ﬁrm top management
team’s hubris rather than a strategic choice aiming at increasing the combined
ﬁr m ’ sv a l u e .T h eh u b r i sh y p o t h e s i si st w o f o l d :M & Ac a nb ep a r to ft h ea b o v e
team’s behaviour to stimulate corporate growth, rather than corporate value,
as the private beneﬁts of the management tend to grow with ﬁrm size. On the
other hand, M&A can be the result of over-optimistic estimations in evaluating
potential post-integration synergies and eﬃciency improvements. Under the
hubris hypothesis, we expect that the deal has either a zero or a negative eﬀect
on the combined post-integration ﬁrm’s value.
Thus, the market’s expectations on the combined gain resulting from the
integration is evaluated, using eq. (4), for the three diﬀerent event windows.
Detailed results are presented in table 4. A consistent ﬁnding is that neither
horizontal nor diversifying M&A deals in the Greek banking industry had any
eﬀects on the combined post-integration ﬁrm’s value. Negative abnormal returns
to bidders oﬀset positive abnormal returns to targets.19
18The analysis here follows Houston and Ryngaert (1994); Becher (2000) and De Long
(2001).
19Evidence in the recent literature is mixed. Becher (2000) ﬁnds 3% signiﬁcant cumulative
abnormal returns for the combined ﬁrm, while De Long (2001) suggests that mergers in the
banking industry neither create nor destroy combined ﬁrm’s value. Only in the special case
where mergers focus both on geography and on activities, combined ﬁrm’s value increases
about 3%. Finally, evidence for the European banking industry presented by Cybo-Ottone
and Murgia (2000) suggests that there is an approximate increase of 3% in value for the
average merger at the time of the deal.
12Thus, following the taxonomy that the established literature suggests, M&A
in the Greek banking and ﬁnancial industry were driven by the hubris and
not by the synergy hypothesis. However, in order to interpret our results, the
evolution and the recent deregulation of the Greek banking industry have to be
taken into account. As it has already been mentioned, the deregulation of the
Greek banking industry started at 1987, while its exposure on the international
competition started at 1992, when the Basic Banking Law, incorporating the
provision of the Second Banking Directive, was passed. At the same time, the
harmonization of E.U. ﬁnancial markets’ regulation and the need for a single
market for ﬁnancial services were the main factors behind an ongoing process
of M&A across E.U. countries.
In this environment, Greek banks had to strengthen their position in the do-
mestic market, and follow defensive strategies in the international market, for
the short run. Exploiting any possible economies of scale seemed to be a medium
or long run goal. For this purpose, Greek banks followed strategies of internal
and external growth. Internal growth strategies contained the expansion of
their network of branches and investments in Information and Communication
Technologies. External growth strategies contained horizontal and diversifying
13M&A. Thus, the strategy for these M&A was the following: bidder banks in-
creased their market share and asset value and abstained from being acquired
from competitors in the short-run. Therefore, even if they were to be acquired
in the future, their comparatively high value could allow them to charge a high
purchase price.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The harmonization of regulation and supervision of E.U. ﬁnancial markets, the
introduction of the euro and the need for the creation of a single market for ﬁ-
nancial services were the main factors behind the ﬁnancial consolidation process
that took place during the 1990s across the European countries. Under these
circumstances, the deregulation of the Greek banking and ﬁnancial services in-
dustry was followed by a serious number of M&A during the second half of the
last decade.
The aim for this paper was to shed some light on the shareholders’ wealth
eﬀects caused by the above M&A. Using the event study methodology, signif-
icant abnormal gains are estimated upon the announcement of horizontal and
diversifying deals for targets’ shareholders. Bidders’ shareholders had signiﬁ-
cant losses in cases of horizontal and zero eﬀects in diversifying deals. Although
M&A in the Greek banking industry were not value-enhancing in the short run,
they can be seen as an external growth strategy whose goal was to strengthen
the position of the participants in the domestic market and help them become
more tenacious in the ﬁercely competitive international environment. However,
further research of the issue, using accounting data, will shed more light on the
long-term proﬁtability of M&A in the Greek banking industry.
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